Abstract: Why do risk premia vary over time? We examine this problem theoretically and empirically by studying the effect of market belief on risk premia. Individual belief is taken as a fundamental state variables. Market belief is observable, it is central to the empirical evaluation and we show how to extract it from the data. The asset pricing model we use is familiar from the noisy REE literature but we adapt it to an economy with diverse beliefs. We derive the equilibrium asset pricing and the implied risk premium. Our approach permits a closed form solution of prices hence we trace the exact effect of market belief on the time variability of asset prices and risk premia. We test empirically the theoretical conclusions.
(2005a) demonstrate via simulations that Endogenous Uncertainty explains the equity premium and leads to stochastic volatility. However, these papers study risk premia via simulations of computed equilibria. They do not study the determinants of risk premia either analytically or empirically.
In this paper we study the effect of market belief on the structure of risk premia. Beliefs are diverse but individually rational in a sense of Rational Beliefs. Our problem is to establish the relation between market belief and market risk premia. We derive analytic results which are then tested empirically by using data on the market distribution of beliefs. Observations on market belief are extracted from data on monthly forecasts of future interest rates and macro economic variables compiled by the Blue Chip Financial Forecasts (BLUF) since 1983. A market state of belief is a distribution of individual beliefs and in the theoretical and empirical analysis we focus on the first two moments. Since an agent's perceived risk premium is the conditional expectation of excess returns of an asset, an economy where agents hold diverse beliefs has many subjectively perceived risk premia.
The literature on excess returns and risk premia is large. We mention a few papers which report on convincing evidence gathered in recent years against the expectations hypothesis (e.g. Fama and Bliss (1987) , Stambaugh (1988) , Campbell and Shiller (1991) , Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) and Piazzesi and Swanson (2004) ). They show that investments in Treasury securities generate predictable excess returns. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) exhibit predictable excess holding returns in bond markets while Piazzesi and Swanson (2004) Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) and Piazzesi and Swanson (2004) do not estimate structural models to explain the source of excess returns but deduce such returns from estimated reduced form models for forecasting returns. Broadly speaking, they argue that bond excess returns are associated with business cycles and for this reason they use pro-cyclical variables such as current yields or year over year growth rate of Non Farm Payroll (in short NFP) to predict excess returns.
Our results confirm earlier results about the effect of cyclical variables on risk premia. However, using our perspective we show that risk premia contain a large component generated by the dynamics of market belief. This component is orthogonal to the observed fundamental variables used in the above studies where the term "orthogonal" highlights the fact that pure belief is a variable measured net of all observed fundamentals, and it has its own dynamic law of motion. The market belief is a state variable reflecting investor's perceived future returns, net of fundamental information. This state variable functions like any exogenous fundamental variable and may be considered to be an externality taken as given by all. In equilibrium, fluctuations in market belief cause large changes in the risk perception of market participants. Here we study the risk premia on holdings of long positions in Federal Funds Futures, 3-month and 6-month Treasury Bills. The annualized mean risk premium on holding such assets for 1-12 months is about 40-60 basis points and we find that, on average, the component of market belief in the risk premium at a random date exceeds 50% of the mean. Since the time variability of market belief is large, this component is frequently larger than 50% of the mean premium. We find that this component is larger the shorter is the holding period of an asset.
We focus on two sets of results. First we show analytically and empirically that much of the time variability of market risk premium is generated endogenously by the dynamics of beliefs. Second, we show that the effect of market belief on the risk premium takes a specific form. When the market holds abnormally favorable belief about future payoffs of an asset, the long position is taken to be less risky and hence the risk premium on a long position of that asset falls. More generally, market optimism about future economic conditions lowers the risk premium while pessimism about future economic conditions increases the risk premium. This inverse relationship leads to the view that"bull" markets in an asset class constitute periods of lower risk premia on long positions while "bear" markets constitute periods of high risk premia. Note that in a rational expectations based asset pricing theory the concepts of "bull" or "bear" markets are not well defined. We test our conclusion empirically in all three markets and find the data supports the theoretical findings.
1.
Asset Pricing Under Heterogenous Beliefs
An Illustrative Decision Model
Consider an asset or a portfolio of assets whose market price is , paying an exogenous risky p t sequence { } under a true probability . rate is the conditional expectations of excess returns. Since it is a function of equilibrium prices, a risk premium -as a function of state variables -is best deduced from equilibrium prices. With this in mind, 4 It would be more realistic to assume the values D t grow and the growth rate of the values has a mean μ rather than the values themselves. This added realism is useful when we motivate the empirical model later but is not essential for the analytic development. 4 the model below is used to deduce a closed form solution of the asset price map so as to enable a study of the factors determining the risk premium. To obtain closed form solutions we use a model which is very common in the literature on Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium (e.g. Brown and Jennings (1989) , Grundy and McNichols (1989) , Wang (1994) , He and Wang (1995) , Allen, Morris and Shin (2006) and others cited in Brunnermeier (2001) ). Nevertheless, our key results are fully general and do not depend upon the specific model used. We now address a key issue. Our agents do not know the true probability of the process { } and hold diverse probability beliefs about it. Thê
1 , 2 , . . .
fact that there are many subjective risk premia in the market raises two questions that will be at the basis of our development in the next two sections. First, why do agents not know the probability ?
Π Second, what is the common knowledge basis of all agents in an economy with diverse beliefs?
Starting with the second question, our answer is past data on observables. The economy has a set of observable variables and is one of them. Agents have a long history of the variables, allowing D t rich statistical analysis which leads all of them to compute the same empirical moments and the same finite dimensional distributions of the observed variables. Using standard extension of measures they deduce from the data a unique empirical probability measure on infinite sequences denoted by . It can m be shown that is stationary (see Kurz (1994) ) and we call it "the stationary measure." This is thê m empirical knowledge shared by all agents. We assume the data reveals that under the m D t , t However, since { } is non-stationary with unknown probability Π , most agents do not d t , t'1,2,... believe (3) is adequate to forecast the future. All surveys of forecasters show that subjective judgment about the data contributes more than 50% to the final forecast (e.g. Batchelor and Dua (1991) ). Hence, agents form their own beliefs about d t+1 and other state variables explored later. With possibly complex beliefs, how do we describe an equilibrium? For such a description do we really need to give a full, detailed, development of the diverse theories of all agents? The structure of belief is our next topic.
Modeling Heterogeneity of belief I: Individual Belief as a State Variable
The theory of Rational Beliefs (in short, RB due to Kurz (1994 ) defines an agent to be rational if his model cannot be falsified by the data and if simulated, its simulated data reproduces the stationary probability m deduced from the actual data. Here we use only the most basic restrictions of this theory but in Section 1.3.1 we review all rationality conditions the theory imposes on our model.
One of the theory's aims is to account for the evidence of persistent belief diversity. But this diversity raises a clear methodological question. In formulating an asset pricing theory should we describe in detail the subjective model of each agent in the economy? With wide diversity this task is formidable.
Also, if the objective is to study dynamics of asset prices, is such a detailed description necessary? An examination of the subject reveals that, although an intriguing question, such a detailed task is not needed. Instead, to describe an equilibrium all we need is to specify how the beliefs of agents affect their subjectively perceived transition functions of state variables. Once specified, the Euler equations are fully defined and market clearing leads to equilibrium pricing. We now explain this observation.
In markets with heterogenous beliefs agents are willing to reveal their forecasts. variables since we shall see that these depend upon market belief (for more details see Kurz (2007a) ).
But then, how do we describe the individual and market beliefs?
The key analytical step taken (see Kurz (1994) , Nielsen (1996) , , Kurz and Motolese (2001) , Motolese (2005a),(2005b) ) is to treat individual beliefs as state variables, generated by the agents within the economy. Here we use the approach of Motolese (2005a), (2005b) as adapted and applied to the problem of this paper. We outline it now. 
The true distribution of is unknown. Correlation across agents exhibits non stationarity and this
property is inherited by the { Z t , t = 1, 2, ...} process. Since Z t are observable, market participants have data on the joint process { } hence they know the joint empirical distribution of (d t , Z t ) , t ' 1 , 2 , . . . these variables. For simplicity we assume that this distribution is described by the system of equations 
The average market expectation operator is defined by . From (8c) it is E t (
Higher Order Beliefs. One must distinguish between higher order belief which are temporal and those which are contemporaneous. Within our theory the system (8a)-(8c) defines agent i's probability over sequences of and as is the case for any probability measure, it implies temporal higher order
beliefs of agent i with regard to future events. For example, we deduce from (8a)-(8c) statement like
It is thus clear that temporal higher order beliefs are properties of conditional expectations. In addition, by (8c) (or equivalently (4) market conditional belief operator is an average over conditional probabilities, each conditioned on a different state variable. Hence, this averaging does not permit one to write a probability space for the market belief. The market belief is neither a probability nor rational and we have the following result:
Theorem 1: The market belief operator violates iterated expectations:
On the other hand we have from (8a) that hence we have that
Aggregating now we conclude that (10) . (9) and (10) 
Rationality: The Theory of Rational Beliefs
We have seen that the market belief is not necessarily rational hence averaging (8a) - (8c) is not required to imply a consistent probability measure. What about individuals? Since they do not know the true probability Π , we assume (8a) -(8c) may not be the truth. But then, can we rationalize such a belief on its own? That is, what restrictions do (8a) -(8c) need to satisfy in order for them to represent the belief of a rational individual agent? What criteria are used in formulating such restrictions? Note that we have already imposed some rationality conditions. First, we argued that rational agents will exhibit fluctuating beliefs since a constant belief which is not in accord with the empirical distribution is irrational. Second, we required to have an unconditional zero mean by requiring individual beliefs to g i t be about deviations from the empirical frequencies. This, by itself, places restrictions on beliefs. We now explain the additional restrictions imposed by the theory of Rational Beliefs.
The theory of Rational Belief (in short, RB) due to Kurz (1994 proposes natural restrictions on beliefs with the view to explain the emergence of diverse beliefs and excess volatility. In a sequence of papers since 1994 the theory has been applied to various markets (e.g. , Kurz and Schneider (1996) , Kurz and Wu (1996) , Kurz, Jin and Motolese (2005b) , Motolese (2001) , (2003) Nielsen (1996) , (2003), Wu and Guo (2003) , (2004)). In relation to the equity risk premium, Kurz and Beltratti (1997) , Kurz and Motolese (2001) , and Kurz, Jin and Motolese (2005a) explain the equity premium by asymmetry in the distribution of beliefs.
A belief is an RB if it is a probability model which, if simulated, reproduces the empirical distribution known from the data. An RB is thus a model which cannot be rejected by the empirical evidence represented by m. Beliefs are specified by the perception models (8a) -(8c) in which the dynamics of expresses the subjective belief of an agent. Exactly as in (5b), for (8a) -(8c) to be RB it g i t needs to induce the same empirical distribution as (7a)-(7b). This amounts to the requirement that
To compute the implied data generated by the model, one treats the symmetrically with g i t other random variables. From (8c), the unconditional variance of is Hence, g
we have the following rationality conditions which follow from (11):
The first three conditions pin down the covariance matrix in (8a) -(8c). The last two pin down the serial correlation of the terms . An inspection of (8a) 
Finally, to ensure the covariance matrix in (8a) -(8c) is positive definite one must impose an additional condition. The condition
is sufficient. Hence the "free" parameters are restricted to a rather narrow range and this (
shows that the rationality principle of RB permits diverse beliefs which differ in parameter values.
Combining the Elements: the Implied Asset Pricing Under Diverse Beliefs
We now derive equilibrium prices and the risk premium. For details see Appendix A where we also explain the term , which is the "adjusted" conditional variance of . We have also explained σ 2 Q Q t%1 in 1.3 why the state variables in (2) are specified by the vector . Hence, rewrite (2) as
.
For an equilibrium to exist we need some stability conditions. First we require the interest rate r to be positive, R = 1 + r > 1 so that . Now we add:
The first requires {d t , t = 1, 2, ...} to be stable and have an empirical distribution. The second is a stability of belief condition. It requires i to believe is stable. To see why, take expectations of (d t , Z t ) (8b), average over the population and recall that Z t are market averages of the . This implies that g i t (16) .
Theorem 2: Consider the model with heterogenous beliefs under the stability conditions specified with supply of shares which equals 1. Then there is a unique equilibrium price function which takes the form
Proof: Average (14), use the fact that the aggregate stock supply is 1 and rearrange to have
Now use the perception models (8a)-(8b) about the state variables, average them over the population and use the definition of Z t to deduce the following relationships which are the key implications of treating individual and market beliefs as state variables
Using these to solve for date t price we deduce 19) shows that equilibrium price is the solution of a linear difference equation in the two state variables . Hence, a standard argument (see Blanchard and Kahn(1980) , Proposition 1, page (d t , Z t ) 1308) shows that the solution is
To match coefficients use (20a) to insert (18a) - (18b) into (19) and conclude that
The stability conditions ensure that (20a) - (20d) 
Equilibrium Risk Premium Under Heterogenous Beliefs

The Main Equilibrium Results
Under heterogenous beliefs we have diverse concepts of risk premia and one chooses a concept which is appropriate for an application. The risk premium on a long position, as a random variable, is
is a random variable measuring actual excess returns of stocks over the riskless bond. The need is to measure the premium as a known expected quantity, recognized by participants. We have three such measures. The first is the subjective expected excess returns by agent i, computed by using the equilibrium map (20a) and the perception model (8a) -(8c) to show that
Aggregating over i, the market premium is the average market expected excess returns. 
Neither (22) nor (23) are objective risk premia. We thus turn to an objective measure, common to all agents, computed by agents studying the long term time variability of the premium and measuring it by the empirical distribution of (21). Using (20a) and the stationary transition (7a)-(7b) we have
Observe that (24) is the way Econometricians and all researchers cited above have measured the risk premium. For this reason we refer to it as "the" risk premium.
We arrive at two conclusions. First, the differences between the premia in (22) and (23) is
This results says that from the perspective of trading, all that matters is the difference of g
individual from market belief. Also, the following difference is important
The risk premium is thus different from the market perceived premium when Z … 0. But the second, and more important, conclusion is derived by combining (23) with (25b). Keeping in mind that from (20c)
, we deduce an analytical expression of the risk premium: 
Volatility of individual and market belief, which we call "Endogenous Uncertainty" contributes directly to the volatility of excess returns and increases permanently the risk premium.
(II) The second is the effect of market belief on the time variability of the risk premium, reflected in with a negative sign when Z t > 0.
To explain this second result we note that it says that if one runs a regression of excess returns on the observable variables, the effect of the market belief on long term excess return is negative. This sign is surprising since when Z t > 0 the market expects above normal future dividends but in that case the risk premium on the stock is lower. When Z t < 0 the market holds bearish belief about future dividend but the risk premium is higher. Since we have data on Z t and on the distribution of belief the result will be empirically tested. Before proceeding to the empirical test we discuss some ramifications of this result.
The Market Belief Risk Premium is Fully General
The main result (26b) was derived from the assumed exponential utility function. We argue that this result is more general and depends only on the positive coefficient a z of in the price map. To Z t show this, assume any additive utility function over consumption and a risky asset which pays a "dividend" or any other random payoff . Denote the price map by
. 
desired result depends only upon the condition . It is reasonable as it requires current price to Φ Z > 0 increases if the market is more optimistic about the asset's future payoffs. To prove the point note that
The desired result follows from the fact that , R > 1 and . other state variables (in particular, the distribution of wealth), the analysis is more complicated since we need to specify a complete model for forecasting but the main result continues to hold. X t%1
Interpretation of the Market Belief Risk Premium
Why is the effect of Z t on the risk premium negative? Since this result is general and applicable to any asset with risky payoffs, we offer a general interpretation. Our result shows that when the market holds abnormally favorable belief about future payoffs of an asset the market views the long position as less risky and consequently the risk premium on the long position of the asset falls. Fluctuating market belief implies time variability of risk premia but more specifically, in the long run fluctuations in risk premia are inversely related to the degree of market optimism about future prospects of asset payoffs.
To explore the result, it is important to explain what it does not say. One could interpret it to confirm a common claim that to maximize excess returns it is optimal to be a "contrarian" to the market consensus. To understand why this is a false interpretation note that when an agent holds a belief about future dividends, the market belief Z t does not offer him new information to alter his belief about dividends. If the agent believes future dividends will be abnormally high but , the agent Z t < 0 analogous to the one showing why it is not optimal to adopt the log utility as your utility even though it maximizes the growth rate of your wealth. Yes, it does that, but you dislike the sharp declines which you expect to occur in the value of your assets if you follow the strategy called for by the log utility. By analogy, following a "contrarian" policy implies a high long run average return in accord with m since this is what (26a) says. But if your subjective model disagrees with the probability m you will dislike being short when your optimal position should be long. This argument explains why most people do not systematically bet against the market, as a "contrarian" strategy (26a) would dictate. released is not known at forecasting time since such data is available only after the quarter ends. As a result, each set of forecasts includes "current quarter" forecast which is denoted by the horizon h = 0.
Hence, h = 1 means "the quarter following the quarter in which the forecasts were made." The BLUF publication was initiated in 1983:01 and circulated forecast data with horizons of h = 0,1,...,4 quarters.
The initial version of the files provided data for the Fed Fund rate, 1-month Commercial Paper rate, 3-month T-Bill rate, 30-year Treasury Bonds rate, AAA long term corporate bonds rate, growth rates of GDP, changes in the GDP deflator and CPI. In 1988:01 the BLUF added individual and market mean forecasts to complete the yield curve on treasury securities covering also maturities of 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 5 years and 10 years. In 1997:01 the forecast horizon was expanded by one quarter and from that date h = 0,1,...,5 quarters. Hence, a uniform panel data set for the entire term structure of interest rates is available starting in 1988:01. The data set has undergone other minor changes since its first release but these are not relevant to this paper and are thus not reported here.
In the empirical work we use a month as a unit of time. is the deviation from the stationary forecast, it must be interpreted properly. Thus, Z (X,h,i) t suppose y is growth rate of GDP. When the agent is "optimistic" about future growth but it Z (y,h,i) t > 0 does not mean he believes output will necessarily go up. He does believe output will grow faster than "normal," defined by the growth rate expected under m. The market state of belief is defined by For the period at hand the five greatest factors explain 43% of the variation in the information matrix and with twenty factors the variance explained is 74%. However, the marginal contribution of a factor declines rapidly implying that little marginal explanatory power is gained when using more than a few factors. Indeed, since we study interest rates which are rather persistent, nothing in this paper is changed by using more than four factors in the stationary forecasting scheme we adopt below. Stock and Watson (2002) concluded that a combination of factors and lags of the forecasted variable is the best information set. For any variable X the objective is to compute forecasts of using information X t%h at time t. In all regressions of Section 3 we need stationary forecasts of market nominal interest rates and for these variables the forecasts are constructed as follows:
(1) let denote the stationary h-period change in a nominal interest rate and for
denote the first four factors deduced from date T information matrix; i' 1,..., 4 (2) estimate the parameters by the following OLS regression: Tables 1A and 1B provide some summary statistics of a sample of extracted market belief variables . The last column in Table 1A reports the first order autocorrelation parameter. Although Z (X,h) t ρ t&1 theory requires each market belief to have a long term time average equal to zero, it is clear the means over short time periods are not zero. Indeed, the fact that the belief indices for inflation and nominal interest rates have positive time averages for the period at hand is significant. It reflects the forecasting bias in the US during that era when beliefs in inflation and doubts about the efficacy of monetary policy persisted (see Kurz (2005) ) despite the mounting evidence against these beliefs. Figure 1 traces the graph of for the 6-months T-bill rate with the two horizons h = 4, 12. Z figure that the dispersion of beliefs increases with the forecasting horizon. This is a common feature of all data on belief distributions.
Data on Realized Market Interest Rates, Rates of Return and Excess Returns
Treasury Bills market. Theory suggests we work with interest rates implied by zero coupon bond prices hence we used data on zero coupon securities with maturities of 1 to 18 months, based on the Fama-Bliss file (see Fama and Bliss (1987) ). The data up to 2003:11 was generated by a FORTRAN routines (provided by R.R. Bliss), using a method developed by Bliss for the unsmoothed Fama-Bliss data set (see Bliss (1997) ). Let be the one period excess holding returns of T Bills with π (j,h) t%h (j + h) maturity held for h periods and sold at maturity j. It can be measured as a monthly or an annualized rate since all we say here about T Bills is independent of the unit of time selected. We study the h -month excess holding returns defined by
where is the one period interest rate implied by a zero coupon bond with maturity at τ . We study R (τ) t Traders are required to put up good faith security deposit which is a margin collateral to ensure they honor their pledge for the deposit as agreed. The collateral securities are owned by the parties to the contract who continue to benefit from any return to their investments. Margin cash is often held in the form of T Bills which yield interest to the owner. Hence a buyer or seller of a futures contract do not have any investment or opportunity cost except for the risk they take on the actual Fed Funds rate that would prevail at settlement. In this sense this market permits agents to trade risk of future monetary policy actions.
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the two maturities j = 3 and 6 months. All data on the right hand side of the expression are then available in the Fama-Bliss file described above. The limiting factor in the study of this market is the BLUF data hence the period of analysis is 1987:12-2003:11. It is useful to clarify the trading mechanics needed to realize h period holding returns earned by selling a specified debt The problem of serial correlation. Serial correlation in forecast errors is inevitable for a well known reason. Computing excess returns utilizes overlapping data and this fact leads us to report, in the work below, robust standard errors of all estimates. We compute standard error using the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) procedure for robust estimates developed by Hodrick (1992) , which generalizes the Hansen-Hodrick (1980) method. This correction places full weight on the lags of serial correlation in excess returns. We thus compute HAC robust standard errors with h-1 lags.
Analysis of the Risk Premium in the Bond and Federal Fund Futures Markets
Estimating Excess Return Functions
We now study the contribution of market belief to long term forecasting of excess returns and test the validity of the theoretical conclusions (26a)-(26b) about the effect of market belief on the time variability of market risk premia. Excess holding returns on three assets are studied: three month Treasury Bills and six month Treasury Bills with holding periods from 1 to 12 moths, and Federal Funds Futures contracts with holding periods of 1 to 6 months. For any asset X we estimate linear excess return functions of the following general form
where is a vector of macroeconomic variables and is a vector of market belief variables to be M t B t specified. We stress, at the outset, that it follows from the definition of that belief variables Z (X,h,i) Since a belief in a higher future interest rate is a belief in a lower future price of debt, a belief which is beneficial to a long position in debt is a belief in lower rather than higher interest rates.
The macroeconomic variables in are natural and reflect the literature on excess return on M t debt instruments and futures markets as noted in the introductory section. First, following Piazzesi and Swanson (2004) Turning to past yields, recall that Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) stressed the predictive power of past yields. Thus, we use yield variables to assess the risk premium in markets for 3 month and 6 month Treasury Bills. We introduce data on yields of Treasuries with 18 maturities covering 1970:01 to 2003:11. To reduce the dimension of information we computed principal components in real time (i.e. employ data up to t) and in all estimates we use the first three factors with notation ,υ =1,2,3. R This lack of comparability should be kept in mind in any cross -table comparisons. Tables 2A-2C present parameter estimates of (27) for the three markets and even numbered horizons. (*) denotes significance at 10% level and ( †) denotes significance at 5% level or better. All are adjusted R
Evaluating the Results
Considering Tables (2A) -(2C) combined, we find that the pro-cyclical variable NFP used by Piazzesi and Swanson (2004) , and the yield variables used by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) are, indeed, important components of the risk premium. We note however that only the first factor of past yields is consistently significant. Our central concern is the size and sign of the belief variables.
Statistical Evaluation.
Starting with a statistical evaluation, the effect of market belief is significant, large and universally compatible with the theoretical predictions. This constitutes an empirical support for the hypothesis that, like society at large, markets are moved by perceptions. Fluctuations of real procyclical variables account for some variability of risk premia but variations in market perceptions, which may express mistaken interest rate forecasts, are at least as important. The data supports the Market Risk Premium hypothesis in (26b). Keeping in mind our orientation convention, the data reveals that the parameters of the mean market beliefs in Tables 2A-2C work from a simulation model (see Kurz and Motolese (2001) ). The reason for it is that markets with more diverse beliefs are more stable since beliefs tend to cancel each other out, resulting in reduced volatility. In essence, with increased diversity the effects of the law of large numbers are more pronounced over time. The converse holds as well: markets are more risky the higher is the degree of unanimity in them. In such markets small changes of market belief result in sharp change of prices when too many people try to get through the same door.
Keeping in mind the limitation of we present in Table 3 the contribution of all belief R 2 variables to the . They reveal again that belief variables explain a significant proportion of the risk R To sum up our findings, from the econometric point of view we confirm the result of earlier work which shows that pro-cyclical fundamental variables are important components of the time variability of the risk premium. The new fundamental forces proposed in this paper are the beliefs of agents. These variables make a clear and statistically significant contribution to the risk premium. Non-Stationarity. Our theory hinges on agents not knowing the true structure of the economy since it exhibits non-stationarity. In that case the risk premium has to exhibit non-stationarity as well.
To test for parameter time variability we could select dates when structural changes have been studied by others. Our view is that forecast functions change for many reasons and practically any date will do for a Chow test. Since the periods 1988 :10-2003 :11 for Fed Funds and 1987 :12-2003 :11 for T Bills are relatively short, we chose the mid-points of 1996:04 and 1995:11 to maximize the number of observations per period. For these sub -periods we conduct Chow tests of parameter time variability. In Tables 2A-2C , presented earlier, we report parameter estimates for the entire period and, in the last columns, p-values of Chow tests for breaks in the two chosen dates.
Almost all Chow tests lead to a rejection of the hypothesis of structural parameter time invariance 
Economic Evaluation: Magnitude of the Effect of Market Belief on the Risk Premium
We now evaluate the order of magnitude of the effects of beliefs on risk premia. Note first, that we cannot evaluate the total effect since we do not have a measure of the constant effect of market beliefs on long term volatility of asset returns, as measured by in (26a Table 4 some long term statistics on the belief variables during the period 8 at hand.
Together with the estimated parameters in Tables 2A-2C we assess the effects, on market premia, of these variables measured in units of standard deviations. Such computations provide an idea of the order of magnitude of the effect of these changes. To illustrate the effect we consider two cases:
decreased optimism and increased diversity of market opinions. (1) The effect of decreased optimism. If we set equal to two standard deviations above its Z (X,h) t mean during the studied period as in Table 4 , the total effect on the risk premium is as follows: (2) The effect of diversity of market opinions. If we set equal to two standard deviations above
its mean during the studied period as in Table 4 , the total effect on the risk premium is as follows: From the above we see that market pessimism can frequently account for an increase in the risk premium of up to about 70 basis points while an increase in the diversity of market opinions can frequently account for a decrease in the risk premium of up to about 60 basis points.
To measure the joint effect of the two belief variables combined, we B may be positive or negative and could thus increase or decrease the premium at any J (X,h) t date. To measure an order of magnitude of the component of the risk premium at t relative to J (X,h) t the mean premium, let be the mean of the . There are two conclusions one can draw from Table 5 about the belief component in the premium:
(1) The component in the risk premium is large: for the assets at hand it is generally |J (X,h) | larger than 50% of the mean premium. We remark that both the premium as well as are J The second result is consistent with the intuition that risk premia are dominated by market beliefs for very short holding periods. This result is also compatible with the results reported in Table 3 that show the without the belief variables are very small for very short holding periods. R 2
We stress that may be negative or positive and in the long run may not contribute much J (X,h) t to the mean premium itself. We also recall that the average risk premium contains the constant component in (26a) which constitutes an important effect of the market beliefs on the volatility of asset return and hence on the risk premium. We do not measure this effect here.
Final Comments: On Bull and Bear Markets
Excess volatility of asset returns above the level accounted by "fundamental" forces is a fact contested by only very few economists. Asset price volatility does not imply time variability of risk premia but the converse does hold true. It follows that the exhibited strong impact of market belief on risk premia teaches us two additional lessons. First, it offers a direct demonstration that market perception should be considered to be as fundamental to asset pricing as the customary exogenous variables. Second, that market belief is actually an observable state variable which can be used for a deeper understanding of the causes of market dynamics. The terms "bull" or "bear" markets have a limited meaning in an REE based asset pricing theory according to which such markets are related to business cycles. Contrast this with the fact that during the last half century business cycles have moderated while volatility of financial markets has not declined and perhaps has increased.
Accordingly, we have shown that beyond the standard effect of business cycles "bull" and "bear" markets do have specific meaning. "Bull" markets are periods of low risk premium caused by unusually positive market perception about future asset payoff while "bear" markets are periods of high risk premium caused by unusually negative market perception about future asset payoff.
Turning to the nature of the effect of market belief we have shown that the premium on holding a risky asset over the riskless rate has two components. The first is a direct effect which results from the impact of market belief on increased excess volatility of asset returns. This premium is constant. The second effect, which we call "the market belief risk premium," varies over time. We have shown that the premium is decreasing in the mean market belief . This means that an Z t optimistic market is a market in which risk perception is low and the risk premium is low. Equipped with a detailed panel data on individual forecasts of interest rates our theory proposes a specific way in which we should deduce the appropriate panel data of market belief. Using such data we then test our theory empirically in the markets for Federal Funds Futures, 3 month Treasury Bills and 6 month Treasury Bills. We show that the data supports the theory and the estimated effect is large.
Also, we shall use the notation . Now compute the expression b
Algebra and simplification leads to the conclusion that we have
(this is a 3 vector) where
Step 2: The Bellman Equation. It is well known (see, for example, the Appendix of Wang (1994) ) that the Bellman Equation for this problem with is written in the form
But we know that
where
Hence, we have an expression for the expectations
The first order conditions are then stated as follows. Equating the derivative with respect to
Now take the derivative with respect to C and equate to zero to obtain
Hence the solution for C must satisfy
hence we finally have We aim to maintain simplicity and analytic tractability and note at the outset that in a rapidly changing environment there is no universal procedures to learn an unknown sequence of parameters. It is then less important to explain why agents disagree and more important to describe their diversity so that equilibrium analysis is tractable.
Description (4) in the text,
, of the dynamics of belief states leads to a simple and useful description g i t%1
of equilibrium pricing with diverse beliefs as shown in this paper. It does not entail extraction of information from market prices, it needs each agent to have a distinct state space to describe his uncertainty and requires an endogenous expansion of the economy-wide state space for equilibrium pricing. However, we now explore conditions under which the Markov dynamics (4) can be proved as a consequence of elementary principles of Bayesian inference.
In a standard Bayesian environment an agent faces data generated under a stationary structure but with an unknown and fixed parameter. The agent starts with a prior on the parameter and then uses Bayesian inference for retrospective updating of his belief. The term "retrospective" stresses that inference is made after data is observed. In real time the agent must use the prior to forecast all variables while learning can only improve future forecasts of these variables. Our model has some parameters fixed and others that change over time. The fixed parameters are known as they are deduced from the empirical frequencies. The time varying parameters, reflecting the non stationarity of the economy, are modeled by the fact that under the true probability is only one possibility. They would, then, seek additional information and use subjective interpretation of other public data to arrive at alternative subjective estimates of to supplement the Bayesian posterior they have. Such subjective b t%1 interpretation of public data arises naturally from the fact that public quantitative data is always provided together with a vast amount of qualitative information which is an important source of subjective interpretation of data.
B.I Qualitative Information and Subjective Interpretation of Public Information
Bayesian inference is only possible with quantitative measures. The fact is that quantitative data like are d t always accompanied with much qualitative public information about usual or unusual conditions. For example, data on inflation are interpreted with reports on normal or abnormal productivity features, conditions of the labor markets, assessment of the price of energy, political environment, etc. If are profits of a firm then is just one number d t d t extracted from a detailed financial report of the firm, the industry, the technology or the products involved. If are d t profits of the S&P500 then qualitative information includes general business conditions, monetary policy, political environment, prospective tax reform, trends in productivity and other macroeconomic conditions. Qualitative information cannot, in general, be compared over time and does not constitute conventional "data." For example, when a firm announces a new research into something that did not exist before, no past data is available for comparison. When a new product alters the nature of an industry, it is a unique event. Financial markets pay a great deal of attention to qualitative announcements which are often the focus of diverse opinions of investors.
There is little modeling of deduction from qualitative information. Saari (2006) uses qualitative information in a competitive model of market shares. Toukan (2006) is a second example. Here we provide a simple formalization (see Kurz (2006) , (2007) (n t%1,1 ,n t%1,2 ,...,n t%1,K t ) 0 or 1. A 0 means the activity turns out to have no effect and 1 means it has an effect. These can be interpreted as 
